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Abstract
Speculative execution attacks like Spectre can be used to vi-
olate confidentiality in all modern general-purpose CPUs.
Recently, many compiler-level countermeasures have been
proposed tomitigate the impact of Spectre-style attacks. How-
ever, the correctness and security of these countermeasures
has not been ascertained yet. Even worse, while some of
the existing countermeasures seem to be secure, others are
known to be insecure and produce vulnerable programs.
In this paper we report on our ongoing effort towards
formally reasoning about the effectiveness of these counter-
measures. For this, we combine recent frameworks for rea-
soning about speculative information flows with a secure
compilation theory telling that a compiler is secure when
it preserves certain classes of (hyper)properties. We argue
that Spectre-like attacks arise from violations of speculative
non-interference, a non-interference-like property. By lifting
speculative non-interference to the secure compilation set-
ting, we obtain a precise notion of security against Spectre-
style attacks for compiler-level countermeasures. We be-
lieve that this criterion is the first step towards formally
reasoning about the security of compiler-level countermea-
sures against Spectre-style attacks, and we discuss our re-
search plan.
To better explain and clarify notions, this paper uses colours.
For a better experience, please print or view this in colours.
1 Introduction & Outline
Speculative execution is an optimization technique that speeds
up computation by predicting the outcomeof branching (and
other instructions) and continuing the execution based on
such predictions. Whenever the processor realises that the
prediction is incorrect, it rolls back the effects of the specula-
tively executed instructions on the CPU architectural state.
Side-effects on the so-called microarchitectural state, e.g.,
cache content, are, however, not rolled back.
As demonstrated by the Spectre attacks [10, 12, 13, 15,
22], an attacker can exploit microarchitectural side-effects
of speculatively executed instructions to violate data con-
fidentiality in all modern general-purpose CPUs. Recently,
many software-level countermeasures have been proposed
to prevent (or at least mitigate) the impact of speculative ex-
ecution attacks. For instance, the insertion of speculation
barriers [8], the use of branchless bound checks [21], the in-
jection of data dependencies [18], and speculative load hard-
ening [2] could all be used to mitigate speculative execution
attacks on branch instructions (the so-called Spectre V1 at-
tacks). Some of these countermeasures have been deployed
in major compilers: the Microsoft Visual C++ and the Intel
C++ compilers can automatically insert speculation barri-
ers [9, 19], whereas Clang supports speculative load hard-
erning [2].
These compiler-level countermeasures, however, are not
proven to be secure, and some of them provide no precise se-
curity guarantees. For instance, the countermeasure imple-
mented in the Microsoft Visual C++ compiler fails in block-
ing some speculative leaks [7, 11].
In this paper we report on our ongoing effort towards
formally reasoning about the effectiveness of these counter-
measures. For this, we require: (1) a property characterizing
security against speculative execution attacks, and (2) a cri-
terion stating that a compiler can preserve such a security
property. Concerning point (1), we rely on speculative non-
interference [7], which we present in Section 1.1. Regarding
point (2), we rely on the robust compilation criteria by Abate
et al. [1], which we discuss in Section 1.2. We outline our
methodology to formally reason about the effectiveness of
Spectre countermeasures in Section 1.3. We conclude by pre-
senting a concrete plan for tackling this goal in Section 1.4.
1.1 Speculative Non-Interference
Several characterizations of security against speculative ex-
ecution attacks have been recently proposed [3, 4, 7]. Here
we focus on speculative non-interference (SNI) [7], which com-
pares the leakage of a program under two different seman-
tics: a standard, non-speculative semantics and a specula-
tive semantics. The former is used to capture the intended
program behaviour, whereas the latter captures the effects
of speculatively executed instructions. Informally, SNI re-
quires that speculatively executed instructions do not leak
more information into themicroarchitectural state thanwhat
is leaked by the standard, non-speculative semantics. To
capture this microarchitectural leakage, Guarnieri et al. [7]
consider an observer of the program execution that sees
traces describing the locations ofmemory accesses and jump
targets.
The SNI framework is parametric in two trace seman-
tics, Sem (P, s) and Spec-Sem (P, s), which yield traces of pro-
gram counters and memory accesses that result by execut-
ing a program P from a state s under the non-speculative
and speculative semantics respectively. Formally, a program
P satisfies SNI (P ⊢ SNI ) if whenever two configurations
produce the same traces under the non-speculative seman-
tics Sem (P, ·), then they also produce the same traces under
the speculative semantics Spec-Sem (P, ·), as stated in Defi-
nition 1.
Definition 1 (SNI). P ⊢ SNI
def
= ∀ s1, s2.
Sem (P, s1) = Sem (P, s2) ⇒
Spec-Sem (P, s1) = Spec-Sem (P, s2)
Definition 1 is formalized in terms of the semantics Sem (P, s)
and Spec-Sem (P, s). For the semantics given in [7], SNI can
be equivalently formulated using only the speculative se-
mantics Spec-Sem (P, s) and a trace projection ·↾nse that re-
turns the non-speculative projection of a speculative trace [7,
Sec. 4.E]. That is, SNI can be equivalently formulated as:
∀s1, s2. Spec-Sem (P, s1)↾nse = Spec-Sem (P, s2)↾nse
⇒ Spec-Sem (P, s1) = Spec-Sem (P, s2)
Before illustrating how (a variation of) SNI can be used
as a security foundation for compiler-based Spectre coun-
termeasures (in Section 1.3), we discuss robust compilation.
1.2 Robust Hypersafety-Preserving Compilation
Recent work on secure compilation has devised a whole
new spectrum of criteria, which we refer to as Robust Com-
pilation (RC) [1], that preserve classes of hyperproperties
(i.e., arbitrary program behaviours [5]). These criteria are
robust, so they talk about compiled code interacting with
arbitrary target-level attackers. RC criteria exist for compil-
ers that wish to preserve safety properties, arbitrary prop-
erties, 2-hypersafety properties, arbitrary safety properties,
arbitrary hyperproperties and many more. Since SNI can
be reduced to a non-interference property, and since non-
interference is a 2-hypersafety property, we choose the cri-
terion Robust 2-Hypersafety Compilation (R2HSP) for our de-
velopment (Definition 2 below).
Intuitively, a compiler (J·K) preserves any 2-hypersafety
property robustly (J·K ⊢ R2HSP), if any two finite traces (or
prefixes) m1 and m2 generated by the compiled program
(JPK) can also be generated by its source counterpart (P).
A program generates a prefix if the prefix is in the set of
behaviours of the program. Behaviours are calculated only
with respect to whole programs, so compiled and source
programs are closed respectively with target and source pro-
gram contexts (respectivelyC andC). Behaviours are gener-
ated according to the semantics of each language (thus their
colouring) but they are expressed in a language common to
both source and target (thus the black colouring of prefixes).
This is a rather common abstraction on program behaviours
which does not hamper our reasoning [14].
Definition 2 (R2HSP). J·K ⊢ R2HSP : ∀P,C, {m1,m2}.
{m1,m2} ≤ Beh
(
C
[
JPK
] )
⇒ ∃C.{m1,m2} ≤ Beh(C [P])
1.3 Are Spectre Countermeasures Secure?
To lift SNI to the compilation setting, wewill adapt theBeh(·)
notions from Definition 2 to their counterparts in Defini-
tion 1 in a new criterion (SNIP, Definition 3). Concretely,
Beh(·)will capture speculative execution (Spec-Sem (·, ·)) ac-
cording to the language semantics, so compiled programs
will be subject to speculation. On the other side, Beh(·) will
capture the non-speculative execution (Sem (·, ·)), so any source
program trace will not contain speculation. The two traces
m1 and m2 will then capture the traces starting from the
initial states s1 and s2 respectively. In the source, they are
generated by applying ·↾nse to the generated traces, in the
target, they are obtained by the semantics. Thus, SNIP ef-
fectively lifts SNI to the compilation setting, evaluating the
semantics of the program patched with the countermeasure
against the non-speculative semantic.
Definition3 (SNIP, Informally). J·K ⊢ SNIP :∀P,C, {m1,m2}.
{m1,m2} ≤ Spec-Sem
(
C
[
JPK
] )
⇒ ∃C.{m1↾nse,m2↾nse} ≤ Sem (C [P])
Proving a compiler to be SNIP (i.e., our form of R2HSP)
means that compiled code behaves as though the specula-
tively executed instructions do not leak sensitive informa-
tion no matter what they interact with (∀C). That is, any
speculatively executed instruction only reveals information
already disclosed under the non-speculative semantics, and
as such it does not leak anything via speculative execution
attacks.
On the other hand, a compiler violating SNIP will gen-
erates code whose speculation behaviour in the target lan-
guage is not possible in the source (∄C). That behaviour
(i.e., that pair of traces) speculatively leaks information that
is not leaked under the non-speculative semantics. Thus, a
compiler that is not SNIP produces programs that might be
vulnerable to Spectre-like attacks.
A final caveat is that we must prevent the actions gener-
ated by the context to pop up in the traces. Otherwise, a
context could speculate and be subject to Spectre and triv-
ially invalidate our theorem. However, our results only care
about compiled code (which contains the Spectre counter-
measure), so we are not concerned with violations from the
context, thus we will eliminate them.
Proof-wise, to prove a compiler is R2HSP (and also SNIP)
we need to create (read, backtranslate, in secure compila-
tion jargon) a source context C starting from either the tar-
get context C or the two traces m1 and m2 . Depending on
the structure and the information carried by the traces, they
may be enough to create C, which means we can use a sim-
plified form of so-called trace-based backtranslation [1, 20].
Otherwise, we can use a context-based backtranslation, re-
lying solely on C to build C [1, 6, 17].
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Webelieve we can show that the aforementionedMicrosoft
Visual C++ compiler [19] does not attain SNIP, while com-
pilers that (correctly) implement the speculation barriers [2]
and speculative load hardening [9] do attain SNIP. These re-
sults will confirm that our approach to reason about compiler-
level Spectre countermeasures is correct and it captures the
right security intuition.
1.4 Implementing This Strategy
We outline our concrete plan for the work we just presented
on reasoning about the security of Spectre countermeasures.
1. As explained in Section 1.3, we will start our effort by
analyzing the effectiveness of the countermeasures
against Spectre V1 attacks, i.e., insertion of specu-
lation barriers [9, 16] and speculative load harden-
ing [2]. This requires formalizing such countermea-
sures as compilers and proving their correctness as
discussed in Section 1.3. We plan to carry out all
our proofs in the context of the speculative and non-
speculative semantics of Guarnieri et al. [7]. How-
ever, we will lift those results from assembly to while
languages for simplicity.
2. Thenwe plan to focus on compiler-level countermea-
sures for other Spectre variants (e.g., retpoline for Spec-
tre V2). This will require extending the semantics of
Guarnieri et al. [7] with additional features, such as
speculation over indirect jumps, and showing that
SNIP still captures these attacks. We will also have
to prove the correctness of the new countermeasures
against these variants.
3. Finally, we want to consider more complex specula-
tive semantics, such as the one of Cauligi et al. [3]
and see whether our approach scales to those seman-
tics too.
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